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The Great Depression was the worst macroeconomic collapse in U.S. history.  Sharp 
declines in household income and real estate values resulted in soaring mortgage 
delinquency rates.  According to one estimate, as of January 1, 1934, fully one-half of 
U.S. home mortgages were delinquent and, on average, some 1000 home loans were 
foreclosed every business day.  This paper documents the increase in residential 
mortgage distress during the Depression, and discusses actions taken by state 
governments and the federal government to reduce mortgage foreclosures and restore the 
functioning of the mortgage market.  Many states imposed moratoria on both farm and 
nonfarm residential mortgage foreclosures.  Although moratoria reduced farm foreclosure 
rates in the short run, they appear to have also reduced the supply of loans and made 
credit more expensive for subsequent borrowers.  The federal government took a number 
of steps to relieve residential mortgage distress and to promote the recovery and growth 
of the national mortgage market.  The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was 
created in 1933 to purchase and refinance delinquent home loans as long-term, 
amortizing mortgages.  Between 1933 and 1936, the HOLC acquired and refinanced one 
million delinquent loans totaling $3.1 billion.  The HOLC refinanced loans on some 10 
percent of all nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings in the United States, and about 20 
percent of those with an outstanding mortgage.  The Great Depression experience 
suggests how foreclosures might be reduced during the present crisis.  
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After rising rapidly for several years, U.S. house prices fell sharply in many 
markets during 2007 and 2008.  Falling house prices brought a sharp rise in mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures, which prompted numerous proposals to relieve distress in 
mortgage markets.  On July 30, 2008, President Bush signed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, which, among other provisions, included a $300 billion increase 
in FHA loan guarantees to encourage lenders to refinance delinquent home mortgages.  
Other proposals then under consideration included (i) directing Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, the two main government-sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize home 
mortgages, to refinance subprime mortgages; (ii) permitting states to refinance loans at 
risk of foreclosure through the issuance of federal tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds; 
and (iii) creating a new federal corporation to purchase distressed mortgages from 
investors and convert them to long-term fixed-rate mortgages.
1 
The creation of a new federal corporation to purchase distressed mortgages would 
mimic a similar agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), that was 
established in 1933 to purchase delinquent home mortgages during the Great Depression.  
Between 1933 and 1936, the HOLC purchased and refinanced more than 1 million 
delinquent home loans. Additional steps by the federal government to ease mortgage 
market pressures during the 1930s included the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System to mobilize funds for home lending, the introduction of FHA mortgage insurance, 
                                                 
1 Senator Charles Schumer proposed (i) and (ii) in remarks entitled “A Call to Action on the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis: Putting Common Sense Ahead of Ideology,” delivered at the Brookings Institution on 
December 19, 2007. Proposals for the creation of a Federal Homeownership Preservation Corporation were 
discussed in hearings before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee on January 31, 2008. See Barr (2008) and 
Pollock (2008). 2 
 
and the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Corporation to purchase FHA-insured 
loans. 
State and local governments also responded to mortgage foreclosures during the 
Depression, mainly by changing state laws governing foreclosure.  Several states enacted 
temporary foreclosure moratoria.  Others made permanent changes that limited the rights 
or incentives of lenders to foreclose on mortgaged property.  In 2008 a number of U.S. 
states considered similar steps to reduce mortgage foreclosures, and legislation for a 
national moratorium was introduced in the U.S. Congress. 
This paper takes a look back at the Great Depression experience and identifies 
differences and similarities with the current period of distress in housing and mortgage 
markets.
2  As with the current episode, the increase in mortgage defaults during the 
Depression was preceded by a period of extensive home building and rising house prices 
and an increasing use of debt to finance house purchases.  Defaults rose sharply in the 
early 1930s when house prices and household incomes collapsed.  This paper documents 
the severity of housing and mortgage market distress during the Great Depression and 
describes major initiatives by state and federal governments to deal with the crisis.  The 
paper focuses in particular on the moratoria imposed by 27 states to limit foreclosures, 
and on the activities of the HOLC, which was the principal vehicle by which the federal 
government sought to resolve delinquent home mortgages.   
MORTGAGE DISTRESS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
The Great Depression was a cataclysmic event. Between 1929 and 1933, U.S. 
personal income declined 44 percent, real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) output fell by 30 
percent, and the unemployment rate climbed to 25 percent of the labor force.  U.S. real 
                                                 
2  This paper extends and draws extensively from Wheelock (2008a, 2008b). 3 
 
estate markets were already showing signs of distress before the Great Depression began. 
House prices peaked in 1926 and the number of nonfarm residential real estate 
foreclosures doubled between 1926 and 1929.  With the onset of the Depression, house 
prices began to fall rapidly and the number of foreclosures rose still higher, from 134,900 
in 1929 to 252,400 in 1933.
3  The foreclosure rate, shown in Figure 1, increased from 3.6 
per 1,000 home mortgages in 1926, the first year data are available, to a high of 13.3 per 
1,000 mortgages in 1933.  In that year, on average 1,000 home mortgages were 
foreclosed every day (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1937, p. 4).  Many more homes 
were at risk of foreclosure—as many as half of urban home mortgages were delinquent 
on January 1, 1934 (Bridewell, 1938, p. 172).
4 
The sharp increase in mortgage distress during the Great Depression was the 
result of precipitous declines in income and real estate values following a period of rapid 
growth in mortgage debt outstanding (Wheelock 2008a).  A rising level of debt does not 
necessarily pose a problem for borrowers, provided their incomes and wealth are 
sufficient to make loan payments. However, between 1929 and 1932, personal disposable 
income and nonfarm residential wealth fell 41.0 percent and 25.7 percent, respectively, 
whereas the value of nonfarm residential debt fell a mere 6.8 percent.  As shown in 
Figure 2, nonfarm residential mortgage debt increased sharply relative to nonfarm 
residential wealth during the 1920s and continued to rise until 1932.  Moreover, falling 
house prices, shown in Figure 3, meant that homeowners who were having difficulty 
                                                 
3  Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (2006), series 
Dc1255. 
4  Farm mortgage foreclosures also increased sharply during the Depression, rising to a peak rate of 3.9 
percent in 1933.  See Alston (1983) for data and analysis of farm foreclosures during the 1930s. 4 
 
making their mortgage payments were increasingly unlikely to sell their homes for more 
than the outstanding balances on their loans. 
Many home mortgages in the 1920s and 1930s were short-term, nonamortizing 
loans that typically were refinanced on maturity.
5  Refinancing usually was easily 
accomplished during the 1920s, when household incomes and property values were 
generally rising, but next to impossible during the Depression. Falling incomes made it 
increasingly difficult for borrowers to make loan payments or to refinance outstanding 
loans as they came due. The failure of thousands of banks and other lenders made 
refinancing difficult even for good borrowers; customer relationships were severed and 
the costs of credit intermediation rose (Bernanke, 1983). The mix of falling household 
incomes and property values and short-term, nonamortizing loans resulted in soaring 
mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates.
6 
FORECLOSURE RELIEF LEGISLATION 
The first attempts to reduce foreclosures during the Great Depression focused on 
encouraging lenders and borrowers to renegotiate loan terms through mediation boards 
and other voluntary arrangements. However, the clamor for compulsory foreclosure 
moratoria grew louder as the Depression worsened and the number of foreclosures rose. 
On February 8, 1933, Iowa became the first state to enact a moratorium on mortgage 
                                                 
5 Mortgage lending terms varied considerably across lenders. Savings and loan associations typically made 
long-term, amortizing mortgage loans. However, banks and life insurance companies often made short-
term, nonamortizing (or only partly amortizing) loans. See Morton (1956) for more information about the 
mortgage market and loan characteristics during the 1920s and 1930s. 
6 Federal agencies created during the 1930s to rescue and reform the mortgage market encouraged the use 
of long-term, amortizing mortgage loans—so-called conventional loans.  Nonamortizing, unconventional 
loans have become more common in recent years, however, which some analysts contend has contributed 
to the increase in mortgage loan delinquencies and foreclosures since 2006. 5 
 
foreclosures. Over the subsequent 18 months, a total of 27 states and the federal 
government enacted legislation to limit or halt foreclosures (Skilton, 1944, p. 78).
7   
The specific details of moratoria legislation varied widely across states. A few 
states imposed blanket moratoria that temporarily prohibited most foreclosures of farm 
and nonfarm home mortgages contracted before a specified date. However, most states 
limited their moratoria to specific situations. For example, some states granted relief only 
for borrowers who were current in the payment of interest and taxes but delinquent in the 
payment of loan principal. For example, a New York statute enacted in 1933 specified 
that “No action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate solely on account of 
default in payment of principal…shall be brought before July 1, 1937” (Central Housing 
Committee, 1936, p. A-18). Foreclosures were permitted, however, against borrowers 
who had ceased to pay interest and taxes, as well as principal. 
Several states directed their state courts to grant moratoria in deserving cases, but 
little guidance was provided to the courts about how to determine which borrowers 
deserved relief. For example, in Iowa, the court was authorized to grant a borrower’s 
request for relief from pending foreclosure unless “good cause is shown to the contrary” 
(Skilton, 1944, p. 82). Similarly, an Arizona statute specified that “In pending or future 
real estate mortgage foreclosure suits, the court may order a two-year continuance unless 
good cause to the contrary is shown” (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. A-3). Not 
surprisingly, the extent to which courts granted relief to delinquent borrowers varied 
                                                 
7  The federal moratorium applied to farm mortgage foreclosures. The Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act 
of 1934 authorized federal courts to grant a five-year moratorium on foreclosure and to scale down a 
farmer’s debt to the current value of his property. The act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in 1935. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act of 
1935, which modified and limited the terms of the moratorium. The constitutionality of the latter act was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937. 6 
 
widely, even within a state. Many courts determined that it was pointless to grant relief to 
borrowers who had no hope of refinancing their mortgage or making payments or who 
did not act in good faith toward their lender (Skilton, 1944, pp. 98-106). In addition, 
courts often required borrowers to pay rent or interest to the lender, as well as taxes, as a 
condition for halting foreclosure proceedings. 
In conjunction with a foreclosure moratorium, several states extended the period 
during which a mortgagor could redeem his property after foreclosure. Again, however, 
any extension of the redemption period was often left to the court’s discretion. In Kansas, 
for example, “the period for redemption on real estate may be extended for such 
additional time as the court shall deem it just and equitable” (Central Housing 
Committee, 1936, p. A-10). In a few states, the legislation was more specific. For 
example, North Dakota legislation specified that “The period within which a mortgagor 
or judgment debtor may redeem from a mortgage foreclosure or execution sale of real 
estate…is extended for a period of two years…” (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. 
A-21). 
Several states also modified their statutes to limit deficiency judgments. Some 
states restricted judgments to the difference between the outstanding loan balance and a 
“fair” or “reasonable” value of the mortgaged property, rather than the difference 
between the loan balance and the price received at a foreclosure sale. For example, a 
1933 Idaho statute specified that “no deficiency judgment may be entered in any amount 
greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, plus the cost of 
foreclosure and sale and the reasonable value of the property” (Central Housing 
Committee, 1936, p. A-7). Other states permitted courts to invalidate foreclosure sales for 7 
 
less than fair value. Most states left the determination of fair value to the discretion of a 
local appraisal board or court rather than attempt to define “fair value” in statutes. 
Several states imposed new limits on the length of time that a lender could seek a 
deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale. For example, Iowa and Ohio enacted 
legislation limiting deficiency judgments to two years after a foreclosure sale (Skilton, 
1944, p. 130). Other states abolished the right of lenders to seek deficiency judgments 
altogether. For example, a 1935 Montana statute specified that “Deficiency judgments are 
abolished in all actions for foreclosure of mortgages for balance of purchase price of real 
property” (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. A-16).
8 
The 27 states that adopted foreclosure moratoria during 1933 and 1934 are listed 
in Table 1, and the geographic distribution of states with moratoria is shown in Figure 4. 
Moratoria were especially common among states in the Midwest and Great Plains, but 
they also were imposed by several states in the Northeast and Far West. Foreclosure 
moratoria were less common in New England, the Southeast, and Mountain West.
9 
Foreclosure moratoria generally applied to both farm and nonfarm residential 
mortgages. However, the pressure for foreclosure moratoria was particularly intense in 
midwestern states where farm foreclosure rates were especially high (Figure 5). 
Moratoria were less common in states with relatively low farm foreclosure rates, though a 
few, including New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, also imposed moratoria, and 
                                                 
8 See Central Housing Committee (1936), Poteat (1938), or Skilton (1944) for additional information about 
the provisions of moratoria and other legislation affecting the rights of mortgagors and lenders enacted in 
different states during the Depression. 
9 The source for Table 1 and Figure 4 is Skilton (1944, p. 78), which lists 27 states as having had a 
moratorium. Other sources omit Oregon, where a moratorium was authorized by a joint resolution of the 
state legislature, rather than by statute (Poteat, 1938), or omit both Oregon and Arkansas (Alston, 1984). 8 
 
according to Skilton (1944), some states imposed moratoria in response to high numbers 
of nonfarm home mortgage foreclosures.  
Alston (1984) investigates why some, but not all, states imposed foreclosure 
moratoria during the Depression. He estimates a logit regression model that includes a 
state’s farm foreclosure rate, percentage of farms mortgaged, and percentage of farm 
mortgages held by federal land banks as explanatory variables. Alston argues that a state 
was more likely to impose a moratorium the higher its farm foreclosure rate, the higher 
its percentage of mortgaged farms, and the lower the percentage of mortgages held by 
federal land banks (which were less likely to foreclose than other lenders).
10 He finds that 
the farm foreclosure rate had the strongest impact on a state’s decision to impose a 
moratorium.
11 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FORECLOSURE MORATORIA 
Governments cause both immediate and long-term effects when they rewrite the 
terms of contracts between private parties. The immediate impact is redistribution of 
wealth between the parties of the affected contracts. The temporary foreclosure moratoria 
and most other changes in state mortgage laws enacted during the 1930s favored 
borrowers over lenders. These actions interfered with the rights of lenders to seize 
collateral pledged by borrowers to guarantee payment of their mortgages. Several states 
also enhanced the rights of borrowers to redeem foreclosed property and limited the 
rights of lenders to sue for deficiency judgments. 
                                                 
10 The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 established 12 regional federal land banks to increase the supply of 
farm mortgage loans. See www.fca.gov/about/history/historyFCA_FCS.html. 
11  Unfortunately, state-level data on nonfarm real estate foreclosures are not available for the early 1930s 
to test directly the impact of nonfarm foreclosures on moratoria adoption. Nevertheless, regional 
differences in farm foreclosure rates and the adoption of moratoria suggest that nonfarm foreclosures or 
other considerations may have influenced the decision to impose moratoria in some states.  See Wheelock 
(2008b) for additional discussion and evidence on the decision of states to impose moratoria. 9 
 
One immediate effect of mortgage relief legislation during the Depression was 
reduced farm foreclosure rates (Rucker and Alston, 1987).
12 However, critics argue that 
foreclosure moratoria induce lenders to restrict the supply of loans and raise interest rates 
to compensate for the possibility that their right to foreclose on delinquent loans or to 
collect deficiency judgments will be constrained. Hence, over the longer run, foreclosure 
moratoria and other changes in mortgage laws may have made loans costlier or more 
difficult to obtain. According to a 1936 federal government report, 
Statutes which provide a lengthy, expensive, complicated or otherwise 
burdensome foreclosure procedure, or which interpose a long period of 
redemption before title and possession to the mortgaged property can be obtained, 
have a tendency to increase interest rates and security requirements throughout 
the jurisdiction, since prospective lenders naturally take into account the 
procedure available for realizing the debt out of the security when determining the 
conditions on which they will be willing to make loans. (Central Housing 
Committee, 1936, p. 3). 
The same report noted that in 1933-34 many states elected to disregard such 
objections because it was widely believed that “unrestricted foreclosure of farm and 
home mortgages under the circumstances prevailing at the time would have deprived 
large numbers of persons of essential shelter and protection, and would have left them 
without the necessary means for earning a living. Such wholesale evictions might have 
seriously endangered basic interests of society” (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. 2). 
Hence, in many states, the societal costs of widespread foreclosures were viewed as 
                                                 
12 I am unaware of any research on the effects of relief legislation on nonfarm home mortgage foreclosure 
rates. 10 
 
exceeding the costs of reduced loan supply and higher interest rates borne by prospective 
borrowers. Even lenders may have benefited from foreclosure moratoria in the short run. 
Although individual lenders had an incentive to foreclose to recoup losses on delinquent 
mortgages, a high number of foreclosures in an area could reduce property values and 
thereby cause still more foreclosures. Thus, a foreclosure moratoria might halt a 
downward spiral in property values that could benefit lenders as a whole.
13 
Although the economic and societal benefits of lower foreclosure rates are 
difficult to measure, research shows that the foreclosure moratoria of the Great 
Depression did impose costs on future borrowers. Alston (1984) investigates the impact 
of foreclosure moratoria in an empirical model of the farm mortgage market. He argues 
that foreclosure moratoria encouraged lenders to reduce the supply of loans, resulting in 
fewer loans made and, possibly, higher average interest rates. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Alston (1984) finds that private lenders made significantly fewer loans in 
states that imposed moratoria and tended to charge higher interest rates on the loans they 
did make. 
Rucker (1990) extends Alston’s (1984) study to investigate differences in the 
impact of mortgage relief legislation on the supply of loans offered by different types of 
private lenders. In the 1930s, most farm mortgages were issued by local commercial 
banks, private individuals, insurance companies, and federal land banks. Insurance 
companies tended to be larger and more diversified and to have a lower cost of funds than 
did banks and individual lenders. Their size and cost advantages enabled insurance 
                                                 
13 Kahn and Yavas (1994) examine the short- and long-run effects of changes in foreclosure laws 
(especially how they affect borrower and lender behavior and borrower welfare) in a simple theoretical 
model of the mortgage market in which renegotiation of loan contracts is possible. Jaffe and Sharp (1996) 
describe the economics of foreclosure moratoria in the context of alternative legal theories of contracts. 11 
 
companies to attract lower-risk borrowers and, consequently, experience lower 
delinquency rates. Insurance companies generally were also more willing to grant 
extensions to delinquent borrowers. Hence, the costs imposed by mortgage relief 
legislation should have been lower for insurance companies than for other private 
lenders. Rucker (1990) finds that, indeed, mortgage relief legislation led to significantly 
larger reductions in the supply of loans from commercial banks and individual lenders 
than from insurance companies.
14 Both Alston (1984) and Rucker (1990) conclude that 
mortgage relief legislation caused significant reductions in the aggregate supply of loans 
in states that enacted such legislation. 
The findings of Alston (1984) and Rucker (1990) on the effects of mortgage relief 
legislation during the 1930s are consistent with other studies that find significant effects 
of state mortgage laws on local lending markets. Meador (1982), for example, finds that 
loan interest rates tend to be higher in states with lengthy or costly foreclosure processes 
or those that prohibit deficiency judgments. More recently, Pence (2006) finds that 
mortgage loans are, on average, some 3 to 7 percent smaller in states in which foreclosure 
requires a court action than in states with nonjudicial foreclosure processes, again 
consistent with the hypothesis that the supply of loans is lower in states in which 
foreclosure is more costly.
15 
FEDERAL RELIEF 
During the Depression, foreclosure moratoria were widely viewed as expedients 
to buy time for the economy to recover and for the federal government to initiate 
                                                 
14 In his econometric analysis, Rucker (1990) treated legislation that limited deficiency judgments or 
enhanced redemption rights for borrowers, as well as foreclosure moratoria, as forms of relief legislation, 
whereas Alston (1984) focused exclusively on moratoria. 
15 Pence (2006) compares bordering census tracts located in different states and controls for a variety of 
borrower, policy, and other census tract characteristics. 12 
 
programs to refinance delinquent mortgages (Skilton, 1944, pp. 73-77).  The federal 
government took many steps to combat the Depression, several of which affected housing 
and financial markets directly or indirectly. For example, legislation was enacted to 
stabilize the banking system and reform securities market practices. Under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the federal government established a temporary 
program for the construction of low-cost housing. The United States Housing Act of 1937 
replaced this program with a system of federal subsidies for local government housing 
projects (Doan, 1997, pp. 39-42). 
In addition to programs aimed at providing affordable housing, the federal 
government took several steps to alleviate distress in mortgage markets. Table 2 lists the 
major agencies created during the 1930s to provide liquidity for home lenders, reduce the 
number of home loan foreclosures, and reform the mortgage market.  The agency most 
directly responsible for reducing the number of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures 
was the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC). 
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created as an agency of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board by an act of Congress in 1933. The HOLC was 
authorized for a period of three years to purchase and refinance delinquent home 
mortgages, including mortgages that had recently been foreclosed. The HOLC had an 
initial capitalization of $200 million and was authorized to issue up to $2 billion (later 
increased to $4.75 billion) of bonds to purchase mortgages on 1- to 4-family properties 
that were in default or that had resulted in foreclosure during the previous 24 months. 13 
 
Interest on securities issued by the HOLC was exempt from federal, state, and local 
income taxes, and the payment of interest was guaranteed by the federal government.
16 
The HOLC was permitted to acquire delinquent mortgages on properties with an 
appraised value of up to $20,000.
17 HOLC loans were limited to 80 percent of the 
appraised value of the underlying property or a maximum of $14,000, whichever was 
less. The HOLC sometimes permitted junior liens (second mortgages) on properties 
against which it held the first mortgage, but refused to permit the total obligations on a 
property to exceed 100 percent of the appraised value. Further, the HOLC made loans 
only to those homeowners it deemed likely to have sufficient income to make their loan 
payments (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 1936, p. 10). Nearly half of the loan 
applications received by the HOLC were rejected or withdrawn (Harriss, 1951, p. 1). 
Although many home loans at the time were short-term loans with little or no 
amortization of principal, the HOLC restructured the loans it acquired as 15-year, 
amortizing loans at a fixed maximum interest rate of 5 percent.
18 
The HOLC was authorized to conduct its own property appraisals and did so 
based on three considerations: (i) market value at the time of the appraisal, (ii) the cost of 
a similar plot of land at the time of the appraisal plus the reproduction cost of the building 
minus depreciation, and (iii) the value of the premises, by capitalizing the reasonable 
monthly rental value over a 10-year period immediately preceding the appraisal date 
(Harriss, 1951, p. 41). Harriss (1951, pp. 41-42) reports that appraisals were often 
                                                 
16 A 1934 amendment extended the government guarantee to the principal on HOLC bonds. See Harriss 
(1951, pp. 152-56) for information about HOLC borrowing operations. 
17 For comparison, $20,000 in 1933 prices is equivalent to approximately $320,000 in 2007 prices, as 
adjusted by the consumer price index. 
18 Initially, interest-only terms were granted for the first three years of a loan. Beginning in 1936, these 
loans were reamortized as 12-year fully amortizing loans (Fourth Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, 1936, p. 30). 14 
 
generous, reflecting more the appraiser’s view about the long-run value of a property than 
its current, depressed value. 
Although private lenders from whom the HOLC purchased loans often suffered a 
loss on the nominal value of their original loans, the HOLC’s liberal appraisals ensured 
that lenders preferred to sell many delinquent loans to the HOLC rather than attempt to 
recoup their losses through foreclosure. Between August 1933 and June 1935, the HOLC 
received nearly 1.9 million loan applications. By June 1936, the HOLC made just over 
one million loans totaling $3.1 billion. For comparison, the value of the private U.S. 
residential housing stock in 1933 is estimated to have been $89.7 billion.
19 The average 
HOLC loan amount was $3,039, and 75 percent were for less than $4,000. By value, the 
HOLC accounted for 12 percent of all new mortgages on 1- to 4-family homes in 1933, 
71 percent in 1934, 26 percent in 1935, and just 6 percent in 1936—the last year it 
accepted applications for new loans.
20 The HOLC provided refinancing for some 10 
percent of all nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings in the United States and about 20 
percent of those carrying a mortgage. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of new and outstanding home mortgages 
across major groups of lenders for each year from 1925 to 1941.
21 Although the HOLC 
did not accept new applications after 1936, it continued to make loans in later years on 
property that it foreclosed on and later resold. The stock of outstanding mortgage debt 
                                                 
19 Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (2006), Series 
Dc55. 
20 Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (2006), series 
Dc983-989. 
21 In the figures, institutional lenders include loans made (or held) by commercial banks, mutual savings 
banks, S&Ls, insurance companies, the Federal National Mortgage Association, and other institutional 
lenders. Non-institutional lenders include individuals, mortgage brokers, construction companies, trust 
departments of commercial banks, and others. Data for new and outstanding mortgages are from Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (2006), series Dc983-989 
and series Dc914-921, respectively. 15 
 
held by the HOLC reached a peak in 1935, when it held nearly 19 percent of all mortgage 
debt outstanding on 1- to 4-family homes. Thereafter, the HOLC share of outstanding 
debt gradually declined as the economy and private lenders continued to recover. Still, as 
late as 1941, the HOLC held about 10 percent of the value of outstanding residential 
mortgage debt. 
Of the approximately one million loans made by the HOLC, some 20 percent 
ended in foreclosure or voluntary transfer of the underlying property to the HOLC. 
Foreclosures peaked during the recession of 1937-38. The HOLC was not quick to 
foreclose on delinquent loans, being “as considerate of delinquent but deserving 
borrowers as its responsibility to the Federal Government and the taxpaying public will 
permit” (Third Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1935, p. 600). The 
HOLC often counseled delinquent borrowers and readjusted payment schedules rather 
than moving quickly to foreclosure when borrowers fell behind on their payments. On 
average, HOLC loans were delinquent for two years before foreclosure (Harriss, 1951, p. 
73). 
Because the HOLC refinanced distressed loans, its foreclosure rate was higher 
than that of other lenders. For example, the foreclosure rate on loans made by life 
insurance companies during 1933-36 was a mere 2.6 percent, compared with nearly 20 
percent for the HOLC (Harriss, 1951, p. 71). The limitation that HOLC loans not exceed 
80 percent of a property’s appraised value probably held down the agency’s foreclosure 
rate, as did its policy of lending only to those borrowers who had a reasonable prospect of 
being able to service their loan. Furthermore, most HOLC loans were made somewhat 16 
 
after the trough of the business cycle, and rising household incomes helped to limit loan 
default rates. 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the HOLC contributed to a rebound 
in the housing market, let alone to the macroeconomic recovery. One study of county-
level data found little association between HOLC lending and changes in housing values 
or homeownership rates between 1930 and 1940 (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2001). 
Nevertheless, in helping to clear a million delinquent loans from the books of private 
lenders, the HOLC undoubtedly contributed to the resumption of private mortgage 
lending. 
The HOLC was liquidated in 1951. After 1936, the bulk of its activities consisted 
of managing the loans it had made during 1933-36, disposing of property acquired 
through foreclosure—including making new loans to assist in that process—and funding 
its operations. The HOLC never received a Congressional appropriation other than its 
initial $200 million capitalization.
22 HOLC loans were funded by the agency’s bond 
issues and operating income (interest, property rental income, etc.). Over its life, the 
HOLC had a net cumulative operating income of $352 million, against a cumulative 
capital loss of $338 million, principally from defaults on mortgage loans it had made. 
While the rapid growth in household incomes and property values from the mid-1930s 
through the 1940s held down the default rate on HOLC loans, falling interest rates 
                                                 
22 Like other government agencies, however, the HOLC received free government services, such as free use 
of the postal system, and was exempt from paying Social Security taxes and overtime wages (Harriss, 1951, 
p. 161). 17 
 




The recent distress in the U.S. home mortgage market has parallels in the 
experience of the Great Depression. Like the recent episode, the increase in mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures during the Depression coincided with a sharp decline in 
house prices after a period of rapid gains. Also like the recent experience, mortgage 
delinquencies during the Depression were more prevalent on mortgages with 
unconventional terms, such as short-term, non-amortizing loans. Furthermore, according 
to Saulnier (1956, p. 10), mortgage underwriting standards deteriorated before the 
downturn of the 1930s, as they did toward the end of the recent housing boom. However, 
unlike the recent experience, the main cause of mortgage loan distress during the 1930s 
was the sharply contracting economy and falling price level. One estimate is that, on 
January 1, 1934, about half of all mortgages on urban, owner-occupied houses were 
delinquent.
24 Not surprisingly, this level of distress prompted numerous local, state, and 
federal actions to relieve and reform mortgage markets. 
The earliest calls for mortgage relief were in farming regions, and states with high 
farm foreclosure rates were more likely to impose foreclosure moratoria, though urban 
mortgage distress or other factors appear to have influenced the decision to impose 
moratoria in some states. For example, in New York, lobbying by commercial real estate 
                                                 
23 The HOLC issued both short-term debt and callable long-term bonds. The average interest rate paid by 
the HOLC on its outstanding debt fell from 3.6 percent in 1934 to 2.1 percent in 1939, and to 1.1 percent in 
1945-49 (Harriss, 1951, pp. 152-56). HOLC loans carried a contract interest rate of 5 percent, which was 
reduced for all borrowers to 4.5 percent in October 1939 (Harriss, 1951, p. 5). 
24 Bridewell (1938, p. 172). 18 
 
interests helped shape legislation for a broad moratorium covering farm, urban 
residential, and commercial real estate mortgage foreclosures. 
In most states, foreclosure moratoria were limited to borrowers who had some 
chance of paying or refinancing their loans. Relief often was denied to borrowers judged 
to have little prospect of ever paying off their mortgage. 
Foreclosure moratoria resulted in both winners and losers. Although the rights of 
lenders to foreclose on collateral or to seek deficiency judgments were restricted, relief 
legislation did apparently contribute to a reduction in farm failures.  The extent to which 
moratoria limited declines in property values and therefore the total number of mortgages 
at risk of foreclosure is unknown, however.  Research has found that future borrowers 
bore some of the cost of debtor relief in the form of reduced loan supply and higher 
interest rates. The evidence from the use of foreclosure moratoria during the Great 
Depression demonstrates how legislative actions to reduce foreclosures can impose costs 
that should be weighed against potential benefits. 
The federal government tackled the problem of delinquent mortgage loans 
directly by creating the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which purchased delinquent 
loans from their originators. The HOLC purchased some one million loans, which it 
refinanced as long-term, fixed-rate, amortizing loans payable in monthly installments. 
Arguably, the HOLC was highly successful. Despite acquiring only delinquent loans, the 
HOLC ended up foreclosing on fewer than 20 percent of the loans it refinanced. 
Furthermore, the HOLC operated without a direct taxpayer subsidy (other than its initial 
$200 million capitalization, which it eventually repaid, and free access to government 
services). The HOLC did, however, refuse many loans on the grounds that the borrower 19 
 
lacked the income to make loan payments. The HOLC also loaned no more than 80 
percent of the appraised value of the underlying property, though its appraisals were often 
higher than the current depressed market values. The HOLC also benefited financially 
from an expanding economy, rising house prices, and falling interest rates, which 
lowered its funding costs, especially during World War II. 
The sharp increase in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in 2007 and 2008 
prompted numerous calls for government intervention in housing and mortgage markets, 
including the creation of an HOLC-like agency to purchase delinquent mortgages. Any 
government response to mortgage distress would entail some cost. A full assessment of 
the benefits and costs of government programs to alleviate mortgage distress during the 
Depression requires further research. There is scant evidence that the acquisition of 
delinquent mortgages by the HOLC during the 1930s encouraged risky lending. 
However, the Great Depression experience may not be especially relevant for addressing 
how a taxpayer bailout of delinquent borrowers and their lenders would affect behavior 
today because of differences in the underlying causes of mortgage distress during the two 
periods. Conceivably, a bailout would more likely encourage risky behavior in the 
present situation (in which lax underwriting was an important cause of the increase in 
defaults) than during the Depression (when a sharp decline in economic activity was the 
main cause of defaults). Thus, while the federal response to mortgage distress during the 
Great Depression provides insights about how the government might respond to the 
current wave of defaults, the very different conditions underlying mortgage distress 
during the two periods warns against drawing strong conclusions from the historical 
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Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB) 
 • Authorized under Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 
 • Established 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks 
 • Created to provide a stable source of funds to member firms for residential-mortgage 
and economic-development loans 
 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
 • Established by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Act of 1933 
 • Purchased and refinance distressed mortgages on 1- to 4-family homes, subject to 
income and loan qualifications 
 • Issued over one million loans between August 1933 and June 1936 
 • Liquidated in 1951 
 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
 • Established by the National Housing Act of 1934 
 • Offers home mortgage insurance on 1- to 4-family homes 
 • Intended to stabilize mortgage market and improve housing standards and conditions 
 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) 
 • Established by the National Housing Act of 1934, administered by FHLB 
 • Provided deposit insurance for savings and loan associations 
 • Abolished under Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
 
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
• Established in 1938 by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
• Created to establish a secondary mortgage market by purchasing FHA-insured loans at 
  par and accrued interest 
• 1948 National Housing Act amendment gave FNMA a federal charter to become 
independent of the RFC; FNMA given authority to purchase FHA and Veterans 
Administration (VA)–insured loans 
• 1968 Chartered by Congress as a government-sponsored private corporation 
 
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1933, 1934, 1951), Haar (1960), Harris 
(1951), Fannie Mae website (www.fanniemae.com/about), and Wallace (1938). 
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